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DEFINE FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES IN THE FACE OF
AGGRESSIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Alexander L. Harisiadis+
Since 2007, American companies engaged in commerce overseas have
grappled with an increasingly stringent regulatory environment. 1 The U.S.
government utilizes the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 2 to pursue
aggressively both domestic and foreign companies with a presence in the
United States that allegedly bribe foreign officials to gain a business
advantage.3 Since the statute’s enactment, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have exercised almost
unbridled discretion in applying the statute, due to a paucity of case law or
authoritative opinions interpreting the Act.4 Furthermore, the ambiguity in the
+
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1. See, e.g., Shearman & Sterling LLP, FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases
Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, at v
(Philip Urofsky 2012), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/Publication/bb1a7bff-ad52
-4cf9-88b9-9d99e001dd5f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/590a9fc7-2617-41fc-9aef-04727f
927e07/FCPA-Digest-Jan2012.pdf (providing an aggregate chart of FCPA corporate enforcement
actions from 2002–2011 that demonstrates a marked increase in enforcement actions beginning in
2007).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
3. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3 (2011) [hereinafter House
Judiciary Comm. Hearing] (statement of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Member, H. Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.); Joe Cassin, Has More FCPA Enforcement Brought Less
FCPA
BLOG
(Feb.
8,
2012,
4:28
AM),
Deterrence?,
THE
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/8/has-more-fcpa-enforcement-brought-less-deterrence.htm
l.
4. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (discussing
how an absence of case law on the FCPA inflates prosecutorial discretion); see also ANDREW
WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, UNITED STATES CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM,
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
2–3 (2010) (stating that the FCPA’s primary interpretive function is still performed by the DOJ
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FCPA has created compliance challenges for companies and individuals
engaged in business overseas.5
Much of the controversy over the FCPA centers on the terms “foreign
official” and “instrumentality.” The Act proscribes the giving of a bribe or
questionable payment to “any foreign official” for a quid pro quo.6 Further, in
the definitions section, the Act states that the term foreign official entails all
the officers or employees of any foreign government instrumentality.7
In particular, the business community is troubled by the lack of definitions
of the terms “foreign official” and “instrumentality” in the FCPA.8 The FCPA
creates liability for improper payments made to a foreign official, or to an
official or employee of a foreign government instrumentality.9 However, who
is properly a foreign official and what constitutes an instrumentality remains
undefined, and consequently, the enforcement agencies have used this
ambiguity to their advantage.10 For example, a consulting fee payment to a
non-government official, as defined under that country’s law, may be
considered payment to a foreign official under the FCPA.11 Further, payments
to the minority owner of an entity that is wholly owned by a foreign
government may also create FCPA liability.12 Further, the employee of a U.S.
company partially owned by a foreign government may be considered a
foreign official under the FCPA.13
The DOJ and SEC’s recent enforcement actions take advantage of the lack
of interpretive opinions on the FCPA.14 The DOJ has adopted an expansive
definition of foreign official to include employees of government-owned
enterprises; 15 this stonewalls attempts to clarify the meanings of foreign
and the SEC, which allows these agencies to read the Act aggressively); Mike Koehler, Big, Bold,
and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TUL. L. REV. 99, 108
(2011) (discussing how the SEC and the DOJ have unbridled discretion under the FCPA).
5. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec.) (noting
how the business community complains that the FCPA’s vagueness makes it difficult for them to
know if they are complying with the statute).
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
8. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1), -3(a)(1) (2006).
10. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3.
11. See infra Part I.C.1.ii.
12. See infra Part I.C.1.iii.
13. T. Markus Funk & M. Bridget Minder, The FCPA in 2011 and Beyond: Is Targeted
FCPA Reform Really the “Wrong Thing at the Wrong Time”?, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS:
CORPORATE AND M&A LAW, at 13 (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.perkinscoie.com
/files/upload/LIT_12_01funkminderfcpayear-in-review.pdf.
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that the DOJ and the SEC are given
significant discretion in interpreting the FCPA).
15. Koehler, supra note 4, at 108–16 (listing the foreign officials involved in recent FCPA
enforcement actions, many of whom are officials of state-owned enterprises).
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official and instrumentality.16 Such an interpretation is contrary to the FCPA’s
legislative intent of preventing the bribery of foreign officials.17 Furthermore,
courts are deprived of binding case law interpreting the FCPA because most
prosecutions under the Act end in settlements, deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs), or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs).18 The absence of definitions
of these terms either in the statute or in case law offers little guidance19 on how
to comply with the FCPA 20 to companies that conduct business abroad.
Consequently, these companies become subject to the statute’s harsh
penalties21 without a practical tool with which to conduct due diligence.22
The new regulatory environment, combined with the statute’s lack of clarity,
crystallizes the need to increase the FCPA’s transparency. The judiciary views
many of the DOJ’s FCPA prosecutions skeptically and has dismissed a number
of cases brought under the statute.23 On Capitol Hill, the business community
and the defense bar have pressed Congress to bring greater clarity to the FCPA
through amendments.24 However, amending the FCPA to achieve clarity is not
16. See generally Examining Enforcement of the FCPA: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 28 (2010).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909–10
(2010) (claiming that the frequent use of NPAs and DPAs has led to a decrease in both judicial
scrutiny and substantive case law).
19. In November 2012, the SEC and the DOJ jointly released the long-awaited guidance
document on the FCPA. The document, entitled A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, covers all major areas of concern related to the Act, including the foreign official
and instrumentalities controversy. See CRIMINAL DIVISION OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
& ENFORCEMENT DIVISION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, FCPA: A
RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
20. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 28 (statement of the Hon.
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (noting how
inconsistent interpretations of instrumentality and foreign official makes it difficult for companies
to comply with the FCPA).
21. See infra Part I.B.2.ii.
22. See infra notes 214–16 and accompanying text; see also House Judiciary Comm.
Hearing, supra note 3, at 19, 23 (statement of the Hon. Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen.,
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (noting that the companies with compliance programs are
still held liable for employees’ actions despite their due diligence).
23. See Andy Spalding, Lord Acton and the FCPA, THE FCPA BLOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 8:08
AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/2/27/lord-acton-and-the-fcpa.html (explaining that the
judiciary checks the executive authority by “exposing bad [FCPA] prosecutions”); see also
Koelher, supra note 4, at 120–21 (rejecting the government’s argument that all tax reductions
which directly or indirectly obtain or retain business constitute an FCPA violation); C.M.
Matthews, Government Drops High-Profile FCPA Sting Case, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Feb. 21,
2012, 10:05 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/02/21/government-drops-high
-profile-fcpa-sting-case/ (highlighting the DOJ’s decision to drop the prosecutions from its
first-ever FCPA sting operation).
24. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 18–36 (statement of the Hon.
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (proposing six
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met with universal support. For example, anti-corruption advocates cite the
recent Walmart Mexico bribery scandal25 as a prime reason against reforming
the Act, 26 claiming that this scandal has “torched” FCPA reform. 27 The
conflicting views have resulted in a two-front battle waging in the courts28 and
on Capitol Hill29 over the FCPA. At the forefront of this battle is the question
of whether to clarify the definitions of foreign official and instrumentality.30
This Comment explores the need for clearer definitions of the terms “foreign
official” and “instrumentality.” Part I traces the development of the FCPA and
examines attempts by the DOJ, the SEC, and the courts to define foreign
official and its related term, instrumentality. In Part II, this Comment analyzes
how the current definitions of foreign official and instrumentality are
inadequate for the stringent enforcement of the FCPA. In conclusion, this
Comment offers a two-part solution for analyzing whether a certain entity is an
instrumentality under the FCPA and if the employee of the instrumentality is
truly a foreign official.

amendments to the FCPA on behalf of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform); Matthews,
supra note 23 (noting how the U.S. Chamber of Commerce paid for a campaign lobbying to
amend the FCPA).
25. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, at A1.
26. Stefanie Ostfeld, a policy adviser for Global Witness, an international civil society
organization, stated, “I think it’s unbelievable that lawmakers would even contemplate weakening
the FCPA when these allegations shine a spotlight on how bribery is still a major problem.”
Samuel Rubenfeld, Wal-Mart Bribery Allegations Stir up FCPA Debate Anew, CORRUPTION
CURRENTS (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/04/24/wal
-mart-bribery-allegations-stir-up-fcpa-debate-anew/.
27. Richard L. Cassin, How Wal-Mart Torched FCPA Reform, THE FCPA BLOG (Jun. 20,
2012,
3:51
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/6/20/how-wal-mart-torched-fcpa
-reform.html (discussing how the Walmart scandal raised questions about whether a weakened
FCPA would be beneficial). But see Richard L. Cassin, Revive Jacobson’s Good-Faith
Compliance Plan, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 27, 2012, 4:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog
.com/blog/2012/8/27/revive-jacobsons-good-faith-compliance-plan.html (explaining that with the
shock from Wal-Mart Mexico wearing off, the FCPA reform debate should be revived).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186–97 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(discussing a jury instruction on the FCPA’s knowledge requirement); United States v. Carson,
No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1, *11 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and holding that a broad definition of the FCPA terms is not
prohibitive); see also Defendant O’Shea’s Opposed Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through
Seventeen of the Indictment at 1–2, 4–8, United States v. O’Shea, No. 09-cr-00629 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 7, 2011) (arguing that state-owned entities are not “foreign officials” or “instrumentalities”
under the FCPA).
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 18–36 (statement of the Hon.
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP) (proposing ways to
clarify the meaning of foreign official and instrumentality); Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the
FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW 1243, 1270–71 (2008) (providing the
DOJ and the SEC with four suggestions to provide businesses guidance on the FCPA).
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I. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND ITS UNBRIDLED EXPANSION
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Origins, Anti-bribery
Provisions, and Penalties
In 1977, Congress enacted the FCPA as an amendment to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 31 This legislative action created the United States’
primary tool for combating foreign bribery by U.S. corporations and citizens.32
1. The Waves of Watergate
The FCPA’s origins trace back to the exposure of corruption in the Nixon
administration, 33 uncovered in the wake of the Watergate break-in. 34 The
31. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, 1494 (1977) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2006)). Recognizing the necessity of a
well-regulated securities market, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 pursuant
to its authority to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d
1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress did not exceed its authority under the
Commerce Clause when it enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Sloan v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 27 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1975) (declaring that it is “frivolous” to question Congress’s
constitutional authority to pass the Exchange Act or any future rules or regulations promulgated
from the statute).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78(m) (2006); see Lay Person’s Guide, Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov
/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2012) (“Congress enacted
the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the
integrity of the American business system.”). Congress’s intent in shaping this anti-bribery tool
was to ensure that the FCPA influenced American firms’ business methods. Id.
33. See Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442–43 (2010) (noting that
aside from the break-in at the Watergate complex, the Nixon administration engaged in several
other illegal activities). John Dean, the White House Counsel during the Nixon Administration,
compiled an extensive list of illegal activities surreptitiously committed by the Nixon White
House. John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 646–48 (2000).
Other illegal activities included a planned burglary of the Brookings Institute, endeavoring to
wiretap journalists and White House staff to anticipate potential news leaks, and the possible sale
of ambassadorships. Id.
34. See Theodore C. Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54
FOREIGN AFF. 719, 719 (1976) (“Indeed the seeds of the present furor were sown in Watergate.”).
According to former White House Special Counsel Ted Sorensen, it was Watergate that led to
“pitiless exposure for all suspect practices connected with [the] government.” Id. At the time,
this intense scrutiny had the unintended effect of influencing bribery in the black market. Id.
Some foreign officials reduced their rates due to a fear of exposure, and others commanded
higher rates as they learned what influence their positions carried. Id.
Although the eruption of the Watergate scandal exposed one foreign dimension of the Nixon
administration’s “suspect practices,” another foreign dimension may have led to the Watergate
burglary in the first place. Purportedly, among one of the reasons for the break-in was that it was
intended to uncover what the Democrats knew about the Nixon campaign’s receipt of
contributions from the junta in power in Greece from 1968 to 1974. Robert Parry, Watergate
Prosecutors Weighed Case Against Nixon Fund-Raiser, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 24, 1986,
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Watergate-Prosecutors-Weighed-Case-Against-Nixon-Fund
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Nixon administration created a number of overseas ‘slush funds’ to channel
illegal contributions to Nixon’s re-election bid and other political campaigns,
as well as to provide for international bribery.35 As a result, numerous U.S.
corporations were criminally prosecuted and accused of paying into these slush
funds. 36 Several years after Nixon’s resignation, the SEC conducted a
voluntary disclosure program that allowed U.S. corporations to self-report
securities law violations and avoid SEC enforcement actions.37 More than five
hundred U.S. companies disclosed “questionable payments” made to foreign
government officials.38 Congress, concerned about damage to the reputation of
American businesses resulting from corrupt business practices, passed the
FCPA in 1977.39
2. The Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions of the FCPA
The FCPA contains two major provisions—the anti-bribery provisions40 and
the accounting provisions.41 Essentially, the anti-bribery provisions prohibit
payments (or promises to pay) by a company or an individual to an official or
an employee of a foreign government or an instrumentality in order to compel
that official to influence government action or otherwise secure an improper
-Raiser/id-9022f82c23ef7572d9a89b8ec3a792dd.
One such contribution of $15,000 was
funneled to the Nixon campaign by a Greek-American, Thomas A. Pappas, who also sat on
Nixon’s re-election committee. Id. Although Congress did not intend to prevent such foreign
bribery in the FCPA, it may be more than a mere coincidence that the FCPA arose out of such
events.
35. H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 241 n.15 (2001); Thomas, supra note 33, at 442–43.
36. See Brown, supra note 35, at 241 n.15 (stating that twenty-two companies were
prosecuted).
37. Id. at 243; Thomas, supra note 33, at 443.
38. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption: The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007); Thomas, supra note 33, at 443. A 1976 SEC report
lists well-known corporations that voluntarily disclosed improper foreign payments. STAFF OF
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 94TH CONG., REP. ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Exs. A & B
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC PAYMENTS REP.]. For example, Baxter Labs, Carnation,
Exxon, Johnson & Johnson and Pfizer all disclosed improper payments to foreign officials. Id. at
Exs. A-2, -4, -5, -7. Also during this same period of disclosures, several major corporations
settled SEC actions filed against them for improper foreign payments. Id. at Ex. B. Included
among them were Ashland Oil Incorporated, Gulf Oil Corporation, and Northrop Corporation.
Id. at B-3 to B-4, -7, -16 to -18. Recently, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a criminal fine of
$21.4 million for FCPA violations by its subsidiaries in Greece, Poland, and Romania. Johnson
& Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4 Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act and Oil for Food Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/ pr/2011/April/11-crm-446.html.
39. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, dd-2, dd-3 (2006).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006).
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advantage for the briber. 42 The accounting provisions 43 act to prevent
corporations from falsifying their books and records in order to hide improper
payments. 44 The SEC is the primary enforcer of the books and records
provisions, 45 unless a knowing violation occurs. 46 In caseswhere there is a
knowing violation, the DOJ has jurisdiction.47

42. See, e.g., § 15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any domestic concern . . . to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in
furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money . . . to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . . . (i) influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do
any act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage.”).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b)(2), (4)–(5).
44. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-831, at 10 (1977) (explaining that Congress intended the
statute’s accounting provisions to ensure issuers “make and keep books, records, and accounts
which accurately and fairly reflect the transaction and dispositions [sic] of the assets of the
issuer.”). Congress hoped to “prevent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes” that
were so troublesome in the post-Watergate era. Id.
45. See Raymond J. Dowd, Civil Rico Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1990
Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 950 (1991). The
accounting provisions have a number of severe penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)–(iii).
Civil penalties assessed can be up to $100,000 for a “natural person” and up to $500,000 for “any
other person.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii)(I). A “natural person” means a human being.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009). “Any other person” refers to artificial persons
such as corporations. See BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY 331 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that the
term “natural person” does not include corporate entities and the term “person” by itself may or
may not include corporations).
A court may also order disgorgement of profits for violations of the accounting provisions. See,
e.g., SEC v. Lorin, 76 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (ordering disgorgement); SEC v.
K.W. Brown & Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“A federal district court’s
authority to order disgorgement in a SEC enforcement action is well established.”); SEC v.
Intelliquis Int’l, Inc., No. 02-CV-674, 2003 WL 23356426, at *21 (D. Utah Dec. 11, 2003)
(ordering the disgorgement of profits for a violation of section 78m among other sections of the
Securities Exchange Act). Disgorgement is defined as “[t]he act of giving up something . . . on
demand or by legal compulsion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 536 (9th ed. 2009).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)–(5) (stating that criminal liability is imposed where a
“person . . . knowingly circumvent[s] or knowingly fail[s] to implement a system of internal
accounting controls or knowingly falsif[ies] any book, record, or account . . . .”). The mens rea
element requires the intent to falsify books and records. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, 532 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a section 78m(b)(5) violation requires the
government to prove that the defendant knew that the act of falsifying the books and records itself
was wrongful, not that the act was a violation of the Exchange Act); see also S. REP. NO. 95-114,
at 9 (1977) (explaining knowing conduct must be “rooted in a conscious undertaking to falsify
records or mislead auditors” and that this mens rea leaves no refuge for the willfully blind).
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 9 (1977) (explaining that criminal violations of the FCPA
are to be handled by the DOJ). If the SEC has collected sufficient evidence for a criminal
prosecution, it will refer the matter to the DOJ. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 11–12.
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i. The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the FCPA—Home of Foreign Officials
and Instrumentalities
The three main sections of the anti-bribery provisions apply to issuers of
securities,48 domestic concerns,49 and foreign nationals.50 “Issuers” are defined
as companies that either have a class of securities registered with the SEC or
are required to file reports with that agency. 51 “Domestic concerns” are
citizens of the United States and U.S. companies that either have their principal
place of business within the United States or are organized under the laws of
the United States.52 “Issuers” and “domestic concerns” are prohibited from
having certain third parties make corrupt payments on their behalf. 53 The
anti-bribery provisions’ third section mirrors the preceding two sections and
completes the broad sweep of the statute.54 Specifically, this section prohibits

48. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (2006).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (stating that section 78dd-1 applies to “any issuer which has a
class of securities registered pursuant to section 78l . . . or which is required to file reports under
section 78o(d). . . .”). A security on a national securities exchange must be registered with the
SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2006). The code requires an issuer to file reports if it has securities
registered with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)–(B). Specifically, the section applies to “any individual
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States” and “any corporation, partnership,
association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole
proprietorship” whose principal place of business is in the United States or a U.S. territory. Id.
53. 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a). These sections specifically prohibit the “officer[s],
director[s], employee[s], or agent[s]” and “any stockholder[s] . . . acting on behalf” of any issuers
and domestic concerns. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). This section applies the Act’s prohibitions to “any person other
than an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . while in the territory of the United States.” Id. This
section was part of the FCPA’s 1998 Amendments that incorporated the requirements of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). S. REP. NO.
105-277, at 2–3 (1998). The OECD Convention required the treaty’s parties to bar foreign
bribery by “any person.” Id. at 2. Prior to the 1998 Amendments, the FCPA covered only
domestic parties involved in foreign bribery. Id. at 2–3. The text of the OECD Convention
explained that all parties agreed to
take such measures . . . to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any
person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage,
whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official
or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.
ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CONVENTION ON
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, art. 1, ¶ 1, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M 1 (1998)
[hereinafter OECD CONVENTION] (emphasis added). In order to conform the FCPA with the
treaty’s language, Congress expanded the statute’s jurisdiction to include foreign nationals
furthering acts of foreign bribery within U.S. territory. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3.
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corrupt payments and promises to pay made by foreign nationals and
companies while within U.S. territory.55 The FCPA’s expanded scope leaves
no party out of the statute’s reach. 56 In addition to direct payments, the
anti-bribery provisions each proscribe payments made to third parties “while
knowing” that some or all of the payments will go to a foreign official.57
The DOJ and the SEC share the enforcement responsibilities of the
anti-bribery provisions. 58 The DOJ is responsible for the statute’s criminal
enforcement as well as civil enforcement of the provisions related to domestic
concerns and foreign parties.59 The SEC is responsible for civil enforcement
of the provision affecting issuers, and it must refer all criminal FCPA matters
involving issuers to the DOJ.
ii. Penalties Under the FCPA
Although the FCPA has a dedicated set of penalties,60 actual penalties for an
FCPA violation can extend beyond the statute’s requirements. 61 The
intimidating nature of potential FCPA penalties led Siemens, a large European
engineering company, to settle parallel FCPA enforcement proceedings with
the DOJ and the SEC for $800 million in 2008.62
Criminal violations of the anti-bribery provisions carry a fine up to $2
million and a possible five-year prison term. 63 Willful violations by
individuals may be punished with fines up to $5 million and jail time up to
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). The definitions of this section expand the statute’s jurisdictional
reach to “any natural person other than a national of the United States” or any business entity
“organized under the law of a foreign nation . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1) (emphasis added).
56. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3. The FCPA reflects the language of the OECD Convention.
Paragraph 1, Article I of the Convention sets out the “any person” language, while paragraph 1,
Article 4 urges signing parties to exercise jurisdiction over persons committing bribes within their
territory. OECD CONVENTION, supra note 54, at art. 1, ¶ 1 and art. 4 ¶ 1. These two paragraphs
form the basis of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. H.R. REP. 105-802, at 21 (1998).
57. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), -3(a)(3) (2006) (setting forth the ban on
payments by issuers, domestic concerns, and foreign citizens within the United States to third
parties while knowing that all or part of that payment will ultimately go to a foreign official).
58. Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 31, at 2.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 9 (1977) (outlining the DOJ’s responsibility for criminal
prosecution of FCPA violations); Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 32, at 2. Because the acts
covered by section 78dd-3 are the same as those in sections 78dd-1 and dd-2, by extension, the
DOJ’s prosecutorial authority also covers those foreign nationals alleged to have criminally
violated section 78dd-3. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 4 (discussing how 15 U.S.C. 78dd-3
eliminates the preferential treatment that foreign nationals used to enjoy under the statute).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g), -3(e), 78ff(c) (2006).
61. See Gary Eisenberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 610–12
(2000) (describing how FCPA penalties are set at a baseline but can change based on aggravating
factors).
62. Leslie Wayne, Hits, and Misses In a War on Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at 6.
63. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(A), (2)(A); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(e)(1)(A), (2)(A); 15
U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1)(A), (2)(A) (setting out criminal penalties for various provisions of the
FCPA).
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twenty years, while an entity may be punished with fines up to $25 million.64
Civil violations of the anti-bribery provisions carry fines up to $100,000 for
entities and up to $10,000 for individual violators.65
The penalties in the statute’s language, however, are only part of the full
picture. The DOJ’s real punitive firepower is derived from 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(d), which covers fines based on monetary gain or loss.66 If a defendant
derives a monetary gain from an FCPA violation, or a third party loses money
due to the defendant’s FCPA violation, section 3571 authorizes a penalty of
twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss.67 This means that a defendant who
made a significant profit through foreign bribery could face a penalty that
greatly exceeds the FCPA’s statutory limits.68
B. New Lexicon: Subsequent Amendments and Just Who Is a “Foreign
Official?”
Much concern over the FCPA centers on the lack of clarity in the definition
of foreign official.69 The FCPA broadly defines a foreign official as officials
of a foreign government and its related entities, government agents, and
officials of public international organizations, such as the United Nations.70
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
65. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), (2)(B) (providing the civil penalties for DOJ FCPA
enforcement actions against domestic concerns); §§ 78dd-3(e)(1)(B), 2(B) (setting out civil
penalties in FCPA enforcement actions against foreign individuals); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78ff(c)(1)(B), 2(B) (setting out civil penalties available in SEC FCPA enforcement actions
against issuers and their agents).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006).
67. Id. Siemens A.G., the German engineering conglomerate, is the most notorious example
of the steep penalties under section 3571, paying more than $440 million in criminal penalties
under section 3571’s pecuniary gain provisions. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Siemens
A.G. for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at www.sec.gov/news
/press/2008/2008-294.htm.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d); see, e.g., United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172, 174–75 (2d Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (noting that section 3571(d) permits a court to assess an alternative fine that
may exceed the statutory maximum only if a jury finds that there was a pecuniary gain or loss);
United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 682 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (noting that
section 3571(d) allows a departure from a statutory maximum fine when the offense causes a
pecuniary loss or gain); United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting
that departure from the statutory maximum is permissible when an offense results in a monetary
loss or gain).
69. See House Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 3, at 3 (“One of the problems is the
contention that the Justice Department and the SEC are interpreting the definition of ‘foreign
official’ too broadly, especially when it comes to payments to companies that are state owned or
state controlled.”); see also id. at 20 (testimony of the Hon. Michael B. Mukasey, former U.S.
Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The FCPA prohibits corrupt payments or
offers of payment to foreign officials, but it does not provide adequate guidance as to who is a
foreign official. The term is defined to include any officer or employee of a foreign government
or any instrumentality thereof, but the FCPA doesn’t define what an instrumentality is.”).
70. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f), -2(h), -3(f) (2006). In the 1998 Amendments to the FCPA,
Congress expanded the definition of foreign official to comport with OECD Convention
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However, despite an increase in enforcement, this definition still remains
unclear, confusing practitioners and businesses conducting business abroad.71
The FCPA’s legislative history suggests that the definition of a foreign
official originally did not include all government employees, unlike
present-day DOJ and SEC interpretations.72 The House of Representatives’
original intent—to which the Senate acceded—was that the foreign official
definition was to include officers, employees, and agents of a government and
its related branches.73 Although the FCPA states that foreign official includes
any employee of a government or instrumentality, the House did not intend for
foreign officials to include “employees whose duties were primarily ministerial
or clerical.” 74 Thus, at the time of the FCPA’s enactment, payments to
ministerial officers would not be prohibited.75
In 1988, Congress revised the FCPA to exempt payments to clerical
employees made for the purpose of expediting an action that the employee
would ordinarily take in the course of his duties. 76 These payments are

requirements. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998). The definition was revised to include officers of
public international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or World Health Organization
(WHO). Id.; see also H.R. REP. 105-802, at 29 (1998) (defining the terms “foreign official” and
“public international organization”). The Senate history of the 1998 Amendments stated that
Congress would define public international organizations as those designated by Executive Order
pursuant to the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3.
The United Nations received public international organization status in 1946. Exec. Order No.
9,698, 3 C.F.R. Supp. 508–09 (1943–1948). The World Health Organization received public
international organization status in 1948. Exec. Order. No. 10,025, 13 Fed. Reg. 9361 (Dec. 30,
1948).
Although the FCPA’s final amended version included “any officer or employee” of a public
international organization as part of its definition of a foreign official, the legislative history of
the 1998 Amendments shows that Congress intended a narrower scope, mentioning only
“officials.” Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), with S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3.
71. See Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1243, 1245, 1250 (arguing that it is unclear whether
the term foreign official encompasses employees of foreign companies that are state-owned or
state-controlled and explaining that the lack of DOJ and SEC guidance creates difficulties for
companies conducting business abroad).
72. H.R. REP. NO. 94-831, at 12 (1977) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the term did not include
employees whose duties were ministerial or clerical in nature).
73. See id. (explaining that the original House definition—with which the Senate
agreed—of a foreign official was “any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or
on behalf of such government, department, agency or instrumentality”).
74. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). A ministerial officer is “[o]ne who
performs specified legal duties when the appropriate conditions have been met, but who does not
exercise personal judgment or discretion in performing those duties.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1086 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12.
76. Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and The Culture of Bribery: Expanding The
Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits To Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 436
(2009); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2006).
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commonly referred to as “grease” or “facilitating” payments.” 77 These
payments are “exception[s] for routine governmental action.”78 The legislative
history of the 1998 amendments refers to such “routine” actions as
discretionary authority to award new business or maintain existing business.79
Just as the definition of foreign official has fluctuated in the past, the
definition of an “instrumentality” also remains nebulous.80 This is problematic
because every employee of a foreign government instrumentality may be
considered a foreign official.81 The DOJ and the SEC have taken advantage of
this murkiness and pushed the definition of foreign official to its maximum
limits.82
Intertwined with the definition of a foreign official is the definition of a
foreign government “instrumentality.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“instrumentality” as “[a] means or agency through which a function of another
entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body.”83 Courts use
77. See Vega, supra note 76, at 436. The House conference emphasized that the
grease-payment exception would not apply to any discretionary action by a foreign official where
that action resulted an improper business advantage. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988)
(Conf. Rep.). This amendment also enumerated the set of official actions for which grease
payments are permissible. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)(i)–(v), -2(h)(4)(A)(i)–(v), 3(f)(4)(A)(i)–(v) (listing the permissible “routine governmental action[s]” for which an individual
or entity may make grease payments to a foreign official).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b); see United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 747 (5th
Cir. 2004) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977)) (explaining that grease payments involved
no misuse of an official’s discretion and that they were meant simply to “move a particular matter
toward an eventual act or decision”).
79. See H.R. REP. 105-802, at 37 (1998) (“The term ‘routine governmental action’ does not
include any decision by a foreign official . . . to award new business to or to continue business
with a particular party . . . .”).
80. Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1250 (stating that the DOJ and the SEC have declined to
provide any guidance on what an instrumentality is). Since many FCPA enforcement actions end
either in a settlement or as DPAs, these settlements are used as quasi-case law for compliance
with the statute. See Mike Koehler, The FCPA, Foreign Agents, and Lessons from the
Halliburton Enforcement Action, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 457, 457 (2010) (discussing how the lack
of substantive case law on the FCPA makes settlements under the act noteworthy for determining
legal precedent). Certain settled SEC actions involved instrumentalities such as state-owned
“corporations, railways, or airlines.” Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal
Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489,
574–77 (2011). However, Professor Westbrook has suggested that, in the case of subsidiaries
whose ownership is several links removed from the government, such entities should not qualify
as instrumentalities. Id. at 533.
81. See House Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Hon.
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (“The DOJ and the
SEC considers [sic] everyone who works for an instrumentality, from the most senior executive to
the most junior mailroom clerk, to be a foreign official.”).
82. Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1243 (stating that the DOJ and the SEC interpret the
foreign official definition to include employees of foreign state-owned or state-controlled
entities).
83. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009).
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this definition as a starting point when determining if a given foreign entity is a
government instrumentality84 because the FCPA provides no guidance as to
what constitutes an instrumentality.85 Yet, determining whether an entity is a
government instrumentality permits courts to ascertain if the entity’s
employees are, in fact, foreign officials under the FCPA.86
C. The DOJ and the SEC Provide Administrative “Guidance” on the FCPA
Definitions
1. The DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases Present an Unclear
Picture of an Instrumentality
The DOJ permits individuals and companies to obtain the Attorney
General’s opinion, known as an FCPA Opinion Procedure Release, to
determine whether certain prospective conduct would violate the FCPA. 87
This procedure encourages businesses to seek the DOJ’s opinion as a
precautionary measure to protect themselves from committing FCPA
violations. 88 To utilize the procedure, an issuer or domestic concern must
submit in writing “all relevant and material information” concerning the
prospective transaction for which an FCPA Opinion is requested. 89 Upon
receipt of a request that meets the procedural requirements, the Attorney
General or his or her representative will issue an opinion within thirty days.90
The DOJ retains the right to pursue action.91

84. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4
(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (using Black’s Law Dictionary’s “instrumentality” definition); see also
United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “instrumentality” that the defendants proffered in a case arising under the
FCPA).
85. See Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1249–50. For example, the term instrumentality
appears in section 78dd-2 under the definition of foreign official, but Congress made no attempt
to further define what such an entity entails. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h) (2006).
86. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (“The term ‘foreign official’ means any officer or
employee of a foreign government or any . . . instrumentality thereof . . . or any person acting in
an official capacity for or on behalf of any such . . . instrumentality . . . .”).
87. 28 C.F.R. § 80.1 (2010).
88. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 67–68 (Testimony of Greg
Andres, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (discussing how
companies may use the Opinion Procedure to obtain advisory opinions for clarification as to
whether certain conduct violates the FCPA).
89. 28 C.F.R. §§ 80.2, 80.4, 80.6 (2010).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 80.8 (2010).
91. Id.
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i. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 93-01
To date, no FCPA Opinion Procedure Release clearly defines an
instrumentality.92 However, the DOJ has issued several instructive Opinion
Procedure Releases that help clarify what qualifies as an instrumentality.
Opinion Procedure Release 93-01, for example, declares that quasi-commercial
entities 93 wholly owned and operated by a foreign government are
instrumentalities under the FCPA.94 The opinion was based on a Texas-based
American company that entered into a joint venture partnership with a
state-owned business of a former Communist Bloc nation.95 Some of the joint
venture directions were to be drawn from the foreign entity.96 The American
partner, fearing FCPA repercussions, solicited a DOJ opinion to determine
whether proposed monthly fees to a joint venture’s foreign directors would
violate the statute.97 The company assured the DOJ that its payments to the
foreign directors would be reimbursed by the foreign partner. 98 The DOJ
declared that the state-owned enterprise qualified as an instrumentality,99 but
stated that it would not take enforcement action.100 The DOJ based its decision
on the company’s reassurances that it would be reimbursed by the foreign
partner for the directors’ fees.101

92. According to Cohen et al., supra note 30, at 1251, the DOJ has issued twenty-seven
opinion procedure releases over a fifteen year span (from 1993 through June 2008). Of those
twenty-seven releases, only three examine the definition of instrumentality. Id. Furthermore,
those three releases relate only to government ownership in business enterprises and the most
“recent” opinion release involving an instrumentality dates back to 1994. Dep’t of Justice,
Opinion Procedure Release 94-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 13, 1994),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ opinion/1994/9401.pdf [hereinafter FCPA OPR
94-01].
93. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a quasi-corporation and
explaining that such entities are often public corporations with limited authority and powers).
94. Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Procedure Release 93-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 20, 1993),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/1993/9301.pdf [hereinafter FCPA OPR
93-01].
95. Id. at 1. The commercial entity was wholly owned and operated by the foreign
government. Id. The parties agreed that members of both the American side and the foreign side
would comprise the joint venture’s board of directors. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The American partner indicated that it would initially pay the joint venture’s
directors’ fees. Id.
98. Id. The American partner explained that the foreign partner would reimburse the fees
paid either from the foreign side’s net profits derived from the joint venture or from other funds it
possessed. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The American side also made assurances that it would educate its foreign partners
regarding FCPA compliance. Id.

2013]

Foreign Officials and Instrumentalities and the FCPA

521

ii. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 94-01
The following year, in Opinion Procedure Release 94-01, the DOJ declared
that an individual officer of a foreign state-owned enterprise—acting in his
personal and private capacity to contract—is a foreign official under the
FCPA.102 The opinion was based on an American company that, through its
foreign subsidiary, planned to set up manufacturing operations on land it
purchased from a foreign state-owned enterprise.103 The American company
wished to retain the private consulting services of the foreign enterprise’s
general director for assistance with obtaining permits and negotiating with the
local power company for electricity supply. 104 Concerned that the general
director’s consulting fees would violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions,
the American company requested the DOJ’s opinion. 105 In its request, the
company noted that the foreign general director made several assurances that
the American company’s actions would not run afoul of the FCPA.106 The
DOJ decided, however, that the director of the state-owned enterprise was a
foreign official under the FCPA even though the foreign jurisdiction did not
consider the director to be a foreign official.107 Ultimately, the DOJ elected
not to pursue any enforcement action against the American company.108
iii. FCPA Opinion Procedure Release 08-01
In some instances, the DOJ opinions do not explicitly state that the
individual in question qualifies as a foreign official.109 In a 2008 opinion, a
U.S. company requested a DOJ opinion regarding a foreign official as
interpreted by previous opinion releases. 110 A U.S.-based Fortune 500
102. FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note 92. The facts of this case resemble the previous opinion
release only to the extent that the foreign national was the general director of a state-owned
enterprise. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1–2. The general director, among other things, assured the American company
that: (1) he would contract with the American company in his personal and private capacity; (2)
he would not use his official position to influence any acts or decisions of the foreign
government; and (3) that the consulting payments were legal under his nation’s law. Id.
107. Id. The DOJ’s disregard for the foreign jurisdiction’s laws in determining whether the
director was a foreign official is particularly noteworthy. See id. (“[T]he foreign attorney’s
opinion is not dispositive, and we have considered the foreign individual to be a ‘foreign official’
under the statute.”).
108. Id. at 2.
109. See Dep’t of Justice, Opinion Procedure Release 08-01, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 15,
2008), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/2008/0801.pdf [hereinafter FCPA
OPR 08-01] (declaring only that the DOJ does not plan to take any enforcement action and failing
to mention whether the party in question is a foreign official).
110. Id. The facts in this opinion are similar to the previous releases from the early 1990s
insofar as they involve a party seeking to do business in a foreign country without violating the
FCPA. See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text.
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corporation wished to purchase a foreign government’s majority share in a
local public services provider, divesting the government of its majority share
and wholly privatizing the company.111 However, the general manager of the
public services provider also held a minority share in the government entity.112
The complicated prospective transaction would involve the minority
shareholder’s purchase of the state-owned shares in the government company,
fully privatizing that entity.113 Next, the American company would purchase a
majority share from the minority owner.114 The American company requested
the DOJ’s opinion on whether the minority owner/entity general manager
would be considered a foreign official.115 Despite a lengthy discussion on the
proposed transaction and associated due diligence, the DOJ did not opine on
whether the minority owner was a foreign official and stated that it would not
pursue an enforcement action.116 The opinion arguably implies that an official
of an entity majority-owned by a foreign state is a foreign official, even prior
to impending privatization.
2. The SEC’s Litigation Releases & Administrative Orders Further Shape
the Contours of the Definitions of Foreign Official and Instrumentality
The SEC litigation releases and administrative orders have further declared,
albeit without clarity, who may be considered a foreign official and what may
be an instrumentality. 117 Particularly, these orders have addressed whether
foreign physicians or foreign hospitals fall into either category.
In 2002, the SEC settled an FCPA enforcement proceeding with Syncor
International Corporation that involved bribes to foreign physicians employed
by state-run medical facilities.118 The SEC found that, between the mid-1980s
and late 2002, Syncor had made improper payments to physicians who
controlled purchasing decisions in the nuclear-medicine departments of certain
111. FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 1–2. The company’s minority shareholder was a
foreign private company. Id. at 2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 4. The U.S. company assured the DOJ that the U.S. company was concerned that
the transaction could constitute payments to a foreign official. Id. at 9–11. The assurances
emphasized the legitimate purpose of the payments in the prospective transaction. Id. The
relevant assurances included: (1) the minority owner would not receive additional financing from
the American company for the transaction; (2) the American company would not make any extra
payments to the minority owner; (3) the minority owner’s premium for the shares in the entity
would be based on legitimate business considerations; and (4) the minority owner’s status as a
“foreign official” would soon cease. Id. at 9–10.
116. Id. at 12.
117. See text accompanying infra notes 122, 127, 128 (noting how the SEC orders declare
certain things to be instrumentalities without any explanation).
118. SEC v. Syncor Int’l Corp., Litigation Release No. 17887, 2002 WL 31761454 (Dec. 10,
2002); see also Syncor Int’l Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46979, 55 S.E.C. 1256 (Dec. 10,
2002) (detailing Syncor’s anti-bribery violations in several state-run hospitals).
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Taiwanese state-owned hospitals, 119 physicians employed by Mexican
government-owned hospitals, 120 and physicians employed by state-owned
hospitals in Belgium, Luxembourg, and France. 121 Without additional
clarification or analysis, the SEC declared that the doctors were foreign
officials and that the hospitals were instrumentalities under the FCPA. 122
Despite the SEC’s broad declaration, Syncor consented to the issuance of an
SEC administrative order that detailed these FCPA violations.123
In a similar enforcement proceeding, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist
order against Diagnostic Products Corporation (DPC) for violations of the
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.124 In October 1991, DPC entered into a
joint venture with a local Chinese government entity; the new entity was
named DePu Biotechnological & Medical Products Incorporated (DePu) and
eventually became DPC’s wholly owned Chinese subsidiary.125 According to
the SEC’s findings, DePu made illicit payments to physicians and laboratory
employees over a span of eleven years in an effort to influence purchasing
decisions in their respective foreign state-owned hospitals.126 As in the Syncor
litigation release, the SEC declared that “the [physicians] who received
improper payments from DePu were foreign officials within the meaning of the
FCPA, and the hospitals were instrumentalities of a foreign government within
the meaning of the FCPA.” 127 Again, notwithstanding the SEC’s lack of
explanation regarding foreign officials and instrumentalities, DPC consented to
the issuance of the administrative order.128
D. Two California Cases Set Forth Multi-Factor Tests for the Instrumentality
Determination
Due to the increase in FCPA enforcement,129 the U.S. District Court for the

119. Syncor, 55 S.E.C. at 1258 (stating that improper commissions totaled at least $400,000).
120. Id. at 1260 (detailing the methods used, which included unpaid loans and improper
hospital invoices).
121. Id. at 1262.
122. Id. at 1264.
123. Id. at 1257.
124. Diagnostic Prods. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51724, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at
*1 (May 20, 2005).
125. Id. at *2–3.
126. Id. at *3 (finding that payments totaled approximately $1.6 million from 1991 to 2002).
127. Id. at *4–5.
128. Id. at *1.
129. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 63 (statement of Rep. Judy Chu,
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that in 2004, the DOJ and the SEC brought a total
of five enforcement actions, whereas in 2010, the DOJ and the SEC brought seventy-four
enforcement actions); see also Year-by-Year SEC Enforcement Actions, SEC (2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/newsroom/images/enfstats.pdf (noting that in 2011, the SEC filed
twenty FCPA enforcement actions).
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Central District of California recently opined on the scope of an
instrumentality.130
1. United States v. Aguilar
In United States v. Aguilar [hereinafter Lindsey] two high-ranking
employees of the Lindsey Manufacturing Company were charged with
funneling bribes to high-level officials of a Mexican public utility, the
Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE), in order to obtain contracts with the
utility.131 The Lindsey defendants, in an attempt to dismiss the indictment,
argued that the CFE’s status as a state-owned corporation meant that it did not
qualify as an instrumentality under the FCPA.132
The defense, utilizing two canons of statutory interpretation, argued that an
instrumentality must share characteristics with agencies and departments—the
neighboring statutory entities—by exercising and enforcing government
policy.133 The Government countered by arguing that an instrumentality must
cover the interstices between departments and agencies because, otherwise, the
term “would be robbed of independent meaning.”134 The court was hesitant to

130. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701 (C.D. Cal.
May 18, 2011) (addressing the issue of whether state-owned companies fell under the FCPA’s
definition of instrumentality); United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113–20 (C.D. Cal.
2011) (defining instrumentality for the purposes of finding liability under the FCPA).
131. 783 F. Supp. at 1108–12. The case was eventually dismissed with prejudice for
prosecutorial misconduct. United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(order granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment); see also C.M. Matthews, Lindsey
Dismissal Stings, But Is Not an FCPA Rebuke, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Nov. 30, 2011, 5:51
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/11/30/lindsey-dismissal-stings-but-is-not-an
-fcpa-rebuke/. Lindsey Manufacturing was a privately-held company in California whose
primary business was the manufacture and sale of equipment used by electrical utility companies.
Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. Defendants Keith Lindsey and Steve Lee were the President
and Vice President of the company respectively. Id. CFE was the public utility responsible for
the supply of electricity to the entirety of Mexico, save for Mexico City. Id. at 1110.
132. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d at 1112–13 (stating that the defendants also argued that,
logically, no employee would be considered a foreign official). Noteworthy is the court’s
strongly emphasized statement, “[t]he FCPA does not define ‘instrumentality.’” Id. at 1112.
133. Id. at 1113–15. The defendants utilized the statutory interpretation canons of noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem generis. Id. The former principle requires the examination of a statutory term
in context and by comparison to its neighboring terms. Id. at 1113 n.5. The latter principle
provides that if a general term follows in a sequence of more specific terms, the general term is
defined by analogy to the objects that the specific terms entail. Id. Applying these principles, the
defendants argued that an instrumentality ought to share characteristics of agencies and
departments, and that a corporation cannot be an instrumentality as it shares no such
characteristics. Id. at 1114.
134. Id. at 1114. The Government rejected the defense’s all-or-nothing approach. Id. at
1115. Instead, the government argued that an instrumentality could not entail only those entities
that shared qualities with agencies and departments. Id. at 1114. Furthermore, the Government
argued that if an instrumentality must share all of its characteristics with a department and an
agency, it is moot to include the term “instrumentality” in the statute. Id.
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render an instrumentality a clone of a department or agency, noting that
“[c]anons of statutory construction counsel against this outcome.”135
Considering each side’s position on the definition of instrumentality, Judge
A. Howard Matz of the Central District of California set forth a
“non-exclusive” list of possible characteristics of an instrumentality:136
[1] The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction[;]
[2] The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed
by, government officials[;]
[3] The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through
governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as a result
of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as
entrance fees to a national park[;]
[4] The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling
power to administer its designated functions[;]
[5] The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing
official (i.e., governmental) functions.137
Applying these factors, the court determined that CFE had all of these
characteristics of an instrumentality.138
135. Id. at 1114.
136. Id. at 1115.
137. Id. Notably, the final factor listed conflicts with the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA). See 23 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2006) (defining “agency of instrumentality” of a “foreign
state”). According to FSIA case law, a foreign instrumentality is an entity engaged in
predominantly commercial, rather than governmental, government-supported activity. See, e.g.,
Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1163–64 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that
a Spanish art foundation engaged in sufficient commercial activity that was funded by the
Spanish government qualified as an instrumentality), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 580 F.3d 1048
(9th Cir. 2009); see also Karaha Bodas Co., v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (“Pertamina”), 313 F.3d 70, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a wholly state-owned and
operated oil and gas company is “an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state”). Despite the
contradiction in terms between FCPA instrumentality functions (governmental) and FSIA
instrumentality functions (commercial), the outcome appears to be the same—a
government-financed and government-operated entity that serves a population is an
instrumentality.
138. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Some of the
listed factors also mirror the features that the OECD Convention Commentaries state a public
enterprise should entail. See Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 14, 15,
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf (hereinafter OECD Convention
Commentaries) (describing a public enterprise as government controlled when a government
controls the company’s capital, its shareholders votes, or board of directors). The court noted that
Congress “embrace[d]” the OECD Convention despite excluding state-owned corporations from
its instrumentality definition. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. In addition, in determining CFE
was a Mexican government instrumentality, the court emphasized factors two, four, and five and
believed CFE’s constitutional and statutory origins, autonomy from the central government, and
government-appointed leadership were persuasive. Id. at 1115.
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The court also examined the FCPA’s use of the term instrumentality as well
as the statute’s legislative history.139 However, despite an in-depth analysis, the
court found neither examination particularly helpful or necessary. 140
Ultimately, the court reasoned that its factors, its interpretation of
the legislative history, and a consideration of the Charming Betsy
doctrine141—which states that U.S. law must not conflict with international law
or agreements 142 —required it to deny the defense’s motion to dismiss the
indictment.143
2. United States v. Carson
One month after the Lindsey opinion was issued, Judge James V. Selna of
the Central District of California also addressed the question of “whether
state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA.”144 In a
case with many factual similarities to Lindsey, the defendants in United States
v. Carson were charged with bribing several foreign state-owned power
company officials throughout Asia and the Persian Gulf for the benefit of their
employer, Controlled Components Incorporated (CCI).145 The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the FCPA counts of the indictment and argued that stateowned employees were not foreign officials as understood by the FCPA
because state-based companies were not departments, agencies, or foreign
government instrumentalities.146

139. Id. at 1115–20.
140. See id. at 1117–19 (describing a structural analysis of the FCPA as “unnecessary” and
the legislative history as “inconclusive.”). However, the court spent some time contemplating the
government’s statutory-construction argument. Id. at 1116–17. Based on the doctrine derived
from an 1804 U.S. Supreme Court case, the government argued that no construction of the FCPA
could violate the government’s obligations under the OECD Convention. Id. at 1116 (citing
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)). Because the OECD
considers certain government-controlled organizations to fall within its definition of a “public
enterprise,” the government argued, and the court agreed, that excluding state-owned corporations
from the definition of instrumentality would violate the United States’ obligations under the
OECD Convention. Id. at 1116–17.
141. Relying, in part, on the Charming Betsy doctrine, the Aguilar court held that statutes are
to be considered in a manner consistent with any international law or international agreement
entered into on behalf of the United States. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 114 (1987)).
Thus, the Aguilar court interpreted the FCPA in a way that would not impair the U.S.
government’s obligations under the OECD Convention. See id. at 1116–17 (discussing role of
the Charming Betsy doctrine in the analysis of the definition of ‘instrumentality’).
142. See id. at 1116 (citing Murray, 6 U.S. at 118).
143. Id. at 120.
144. United States v. Carson, SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
May 18, 2011) (order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss counts one through ten of the
indictment).
145. Id. at *1–2.
146. Id. at *1.
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The arguments advanced by the defense in Carson were similar to those
advanced in Lindsey.147 However, the court in Carson resolved that it could
not decide as a matter of law whether a state-owned company was an
instrumentality. 148 Rather, the court concluded that a jury should ascertain
whether a state-owned company may be considered an instrumentality.149 To
assist with this factual determination, the court set forth a list of non-exclusive
factors to supplement the comparable list enumerated in Lindsey. 150 These
factors require the parties to present evidence that demonstrates:
[1] The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its
employees;
[2] The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity;
[3] The purpose of the entity’s activities;
[4] The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s
law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling
power to administer its designated functions;
[5] The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and
[6] The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including
the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, special tax
treatment, and loans).151
Next, the court examined the FCPA’s statutory text and determined that
instrumentalities include entities that are not “agencies” or “departments,” but
that do carry out government functions.152 Similar to the Lindsey court, the
Carson court stated that the definition of instrumentality could not
categorically exclude state-owned companies. 153 The court explained that
although evidence of a government’s monetary investment into a business
entity is insufficient to define that entity as an instrumentality, evidence of that
investment, coupled with evidence indicating that an entity is carrying out

147. See id. at *8 (“In Aguilar . . . defendants made virtually identical arguments to those
made here. . . .”). The arguments advanced were based on a statutory analysis designed to
exclude state-owned companies from the definition of instrumentality. Id. The defendants even
advanced a noscitur a sociis defense to restrict “instrumentality” to a very narrow meaning. Id. at
*5. This was rejected by the court because construction of a statutory term requires consideration
of the entire statute. Id. The court stated that Congress meant for an instrumentality to
encompass entities that an “agency” or “department” does not cover. Id.
148. Id. at *3.
149. See id. at *9 (concluding that state-owned companies generally may be encompassed by
the term “instrumentality,” but that a jury must decide whether a specific business qualifies).
150. Id. at *3–4.
151. Id. These factors also mirror the OECD Convention Commentaries’ description of a
state-owned enterprise. See supra note 138.
152. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4–5.
153. Id. at *5.
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government functions, 154 would suffice to characterize that entity as an
instrumentality.155
The court also looked to domestic examples of instrumentalities to bolster its
point that a state-owned corporation such as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) or the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) could qualify as
an instrumentality.156 Additionally, the court examined the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act—another statute containing the term instrumentality in its
language—to demonstrate that corporations can be instrumentalities. 157
Ultimately, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment
because it could not determine as a matter of law that a state-owned
corporation was an instrumentality.158
II. THE FCPA REQUIRES REFINEMENT IN THE FACE OF THE CURRENT
ENFORCEMENT TREND
The FCPA is a broad statute which requires the compliance of overseas
businesses. 159 Anyone doing business abroad—including foreign nationals
employed by U.S. companies and their subsidiaries—is subject to the FCPA’s

154. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that the provision of electricity in Mexico constitutes a “quintessential government
function”); see also Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *6 (providing examples of state-owned
entities that carry out government functions, such as rail transport or regional economic
development).
155. See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5.
156. See id. at *6 (explaining that the United States has historically utilized corporations to
carry out government goals).
157. See id. at *7 (arguing that because Congress passed the FSIA a year before the FCPA,
the inclusion of state-owned corporation under the definition of instrumentality in the FSIA helps
to support the conclusion that instrumentalities under the FCPA may include a state-owned
company). The court examined the FSIA because that statute includes state-owned corporations
in its definition instrumentalities. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b)(2) (2006) (“An ‘agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity . . . which is a separate legal person, corporate
or otherwise, . . . a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof . . . .”). The defense argued that Congress previously defined
instrumentality to entail state-owned corporations, and that by excluding said entities from the
FCPA, Congress intended the exclusion from the FCPA’s definition of an instrumentality.
Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *7. The court was unconvinced, noting that the doctrine of
statutory interpretation by which an omission of particular language that appears elsewhere in the
statue is done intentionally by Congress only applies intra-statutorily, not inter-statutorily. Id.
Therefore, the exclusion of a phrase in the FCPA indicating that an instrumentality could include
a state-owned company is not presumed to be an intentional or purposeful exclusion by Congress.
Id.
158. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *3, 9, 11.
159. See supra Part I (discussing the ways in which various institutions have interpreted the
FCPA’s foreign official and instrumentality terms and analyzing how this has caused difficulty
for business owners seeking to ascertain a standard under the statute).
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prohibitions.160 Additionally, the DOJ and the SEC are currently engaged in a
record-breaking enforcement campaign,161 and despite recent setbacks,162 those
agencies have promised to continue strong enforcement.163
Despite such stringent enforcement and broad jurisdiction, the FCPA’s
administrative guidance and interpretive case law pales in comparison with
other statutes.164 This creates a difficult choice for businesses with overseas
operations: either enter into risky business arrangements abroad with
individuals or entities who have unclear connections to a foreign government,
or conduct business conservatively and risk losing a competitive edge by
eschewing foreign markets.165
A. The Plain Meaning of the FCPA and Its Legislative History Do Not Support
the DOJ’s and the SEC’s Interpretations of Foreign Officials and
Instrumentalities
1. The Original Act’s Legislative History Indicates Congress’s Intent to
Limit the Definition of Foreign Officials
The legislative history of the original FCPA enacted in 1977 indicates that
Congress wanted the statute to cover only those bribes made to a government
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting foreign nationals and corporations from
engaging in bribery while in U.S. territory).
161. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 522–23 (providing statistics demonstrating a dramatic
increase in FCPA enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and the SEC from 2007 to 2010).
162. See C.M. Matthews, Houston Judge Tosses Foreign Bribery Case, Hands DOJ New
Setback, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Jan. 17, 2012 12:36 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/corruption-currents/2012/01/17/houston-judge-tosses-foreign-bribery-case-hands-doj-new-setbac
k/ (explaining that the defendant’s FCPA indictment was dismissed because the judge found the
government’s chief witness unreliable); C.M. Matthews, Judge Dismisses Landmark Bribery
Conviction, Rips DOJ, CORRUPTION CURRENTS (Dec. 1, 2011, 6:57 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/12/01/judge-dismisses-landmark-bribery-convictio
n-rips-doj/ (explaining that the Lindsey conviction was dismissed due to gross prosecutorial
misconduct); C.M. Matthews, Justice Dept. Drops FCPA Sting Case, WSJ LAW BLOG (Feb. 21,
2012,
11:56
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/02/21/justice-dept-drops-fcpa-sting-ca
se/ (explaining that, in light of several mistrials and acquittals, the DOJ would decline to further
prosecute sixteen defendants ensnared in an FCPA sting operation).
163. Jenna Greene, Agency Officials Say Feds Remain Committed to FCPA Enforcement,
THE BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Mar. 8, 2012, 3:30 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad
.com/blt/2012/03/agency-officials-say-feds-remain-committed-to-fcpa-enforcement.html (quoting
the DOJ Fraud Department Assistant Chief as saying “We’re in this for the long haul”).
164. See Matthew J. Kovacich, Backyard Business Going Global: The Consequences of
Increased Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) on Minnesota and
Wisconsin, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 529, 537–38 (2009) (explaining how key terms in the FCPA lack
definition and that there is a dearth of binding precedent interpreting the statute’s terms).
165. Cf. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 20 (statement of the Hon. Michael
Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (emphasizing that a lack of
clarity in the statutory terms makes it difficult for companies to determine what constitutes
permissible conduct).
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official or employee who carry out a government function. 166 Further, the
House of Representatives, by initially excluding employees with ministerial or
clerical duties from the law’s prohibitions, did not intend for every government
employee to qualify as a foreign official.167 Rather, the House understood the
realities of doing business abroad and meant “foreign official” to encompass
only those individuals whose authority was susceptible to corruption.168
The Senate’s acceptance of the House’s foreign official definition supports
the argument that Congress intended a restrained definition.169 The decision to
use the word government “officials” rather than “employees” indicates that
Congress wished to criminalize bribes to individuals with decision-making
authority to execute a government function.170 Congress believed that those
functions, when exercised, could secure a business advantage and potentially
be corruptible. 171 However, ministerial officers have no discretion that is
corruptible 172 because corruption entails the gain of an advantage through
dereliction of that discretion.173 Congress, realizing this reality, intended to

166. H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).
167. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (indicating that the proscribed payments
would be those made to foreign officials with influence over other officials or branches of
government).
168. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8. In particular, the legislative history notes that,
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign
official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes
that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world . . . As a result, the
committee has not attempted to reach such payments. However, where the payment is
made to influence the passage of law, regulations, the placement of government
contracts, the formulation of policy or other discretionary governmental functions, such
payments would be prohibited.
Id. (emphasis added).
169. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-831, at 12 (stating that the Senate receded to the House’s
definition of foreign official, which excluded those employees with ministerial or clerical duties);
see also Jon Jordan, The OECD’s Call for an End to “Corrosive” Facilitation Payments and the
International Focus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 881, 889–90 (2011) (explaining that Congress intended this
circumscription of “foreign official” to be the statute’s original “grease payments” exception).
170. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 50–51 (written testimony of
Shana-Tara Regon, Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers) (arguing that the FCPA’s original
purpose neither comports with current government interpretations of mid-level officials as foreign
officials nor with a layperson’s interpretation of what individuals would be considered true
“officials”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (emphasizing that the reasoning behind the use
of the adjective “corrupt” to describe the prohibited action and why this adjective cannot apply to
ministerial officers).
171. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8. (providing examples of corruptible official duties, such
as directing business to the payor or obtaining preferential legislation). Ministerial officers can
only take actions that involve no discretion; they cannot secure a business advantage. Id.
172. See id. (explaining that such duties involve no discretion and will occur in any event).
173. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009) (“The act of doing something with an
intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others”); see also 3
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limit the term foreign official to those officials who have discretionary
governmental authority.174
2. Subsequent FCPA Amendments Support a Narrow Reading of Foreign
Official to Apply Only to Officials with Discretionary Authority
Subsequent amendments to the FCPA demonstrate a hesitation to expand the
definition of a foreign official, demonstrating a common thread of limiting the
definition to those who possess some discretion to act. 175 The 1988
Amendments, which created the grease payments exception,176 narrowed the
original ministerial exception and stated that a payment to any foreign official
with discretionary power could not qualify as a grease payment. 177 The
legislative history of the 1998 Amendments, however, expanded the definition
to incorporate officials of public international organizations.178 Although the
amended statute’s final version prohibited bribes to officials and employees of
foreign governments,179 the legislative history demonstrates an implied unease
with any expansion of the definition of a foreign official.180
3. The Plain Meaning of Foreign Official and Instrumentality Do Not
Support Broad Definitions
The plain meanings of foreign official and instrumentality do not coincide
with the broad, non-binding meanings that the DOJ and the SEC have ascribed
to them.181 Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “official” as someone who is
“elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign
powers”182 and an “instrumentality” as “[a] means or agency through which
function of another entity is accomplished, such as a branch of a governing

OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 972 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “corrupt” as “[t]o destroy or pervert
the integrity or fidelity of (a person) in his discharge of duty”).
174. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (explaining that the FCPA is violated when a payment to
a government official is made to influence “the passage of law, regulation, the placement of
government contracts, the formulation of policy, or other discretionary government functions”).
175. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 921 (1988) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the grease payment
exception does not apply to official actions involving an exercise of discretion by a government
official); see also S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (stating that officials of public international
organizations are to be included in the definition of foreign official).
176. See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 77 (discussing how the 1988 Amendments limited acceptable grease
payments to an enumerated list of actions).
178. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3.
179. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006) (providing that the phrase foreign official
includes “any officer or employee”).
180. Compare id. (defining officials of public international organizations to include their
officers and employees), with H.R. REP. 105-802, at 21 (1998) (defining only the officials of a
public international organization as foreign officials).
181. See supra Part I.C.
182. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (9th ed. 2009).
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body.” 183 The plain meaning of “official” connotes that the individual is
tasked with carrying out a government function, like protecting the health and
welfare of the nation. 184 Similarly, a government “instrumentality” plainly
means that the entity assists in the accomplishment of a government
purpose. 185 However, the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure Releases focus on
government-owned commercial entities.186 The DOJ appears more concerned
with a government’s presence in an instrumentality than with whether the
instrumentality carries out a government purpose.187 An entity must have both
government presence and the ability to assist in exercising the government’s
sovereign powers to be an instrumentality.
B. Lindsey and Carson Demonstrate Cautious, Yet Positive, Steps Toward
Refined Definitions of Foreign Official and Instrumentality
The cases from the Central District of California mark positive steps toward
the creation of an analysis for determining what constitutes an
instrumentality. 188 In doing so, the Lindsey and Carson courts promulgate
criteria that are altogether more restrictive and definite than the DOJ’s and the
SEC’s expansive interpretations of the FCPA. 189 The courts’ inquiries
centered on an instrumentality’s financing, level of government ownership,
vested controlling power, and purpose.190 These inquiries mirrored some of
the public enterprise features discussed in the commentaries of the OECD
Both the DOJ’s and the SEC’s interpretations of
Convention. 191
183. Id. at 870; see also 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1052 (2d ed. 1989) (“[T]he fact or
function of serving or being used for the accomplishment of some purpose or end.”).
184. Cf. Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard:
Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 133
(2005) (noting that the WHO Constitution states that governments are responsible for protecting
the public health and well-being).
185. Cf. House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 27 n.15 (statement of the Hon.
Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen., Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (analogizing the
current definition of instrumentality to General Motors as an example of a ‘state-owned’
corporation: if the United States was a foreign government, GM would be an instrumentality).
See Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Apr. 7, 2010) (detailing the change of
ownership from the former private-owned GM Corporation to the government-owned GM
Company).
186. See supra Part I.C.1.
187. See supra Part I.C.1; see also, e.g., FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94 (declaring that a
quasi-commercial entity wholly owned and operated by a foreign official is an instrumentality
despite the organization’s primary purpose).
188. See supra Part I.D.
189. See supra Part I.D (noting that the majority opinions in Aguilar and Carson provide a
non-exclusive list of factors to assist the jury in making a factual determination regarding whether
a state-owned corporation is an instrumentality).
190. See text accompanying notes 137 and 141.
191. See OECD Convention Commentaries, supra note 138, at 15 (providing factual
scenarios that help determine whether an enterprise is a public enterprise/instrumentality).
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instrumentalities look only for the presence, not the degree, of government
Although both courts ultimately accepted the
control/financing. 192
government’s position that the entities in question were instrumentalities, the
opinions demonstrate that the courts are unwilling to rule blindly.193 One such
example is the Lindsey opinion’s focus on whether an instrumentality is
“perceived and understood” to perform an official function.194 If a reasonable
juror believes that the alleged instrumentality does not perform an official
function, the entity may fall outside the instrumentality definition. 195 For
corporate counsel to the pharmaceutical industry, this factor will require
examining the depth a government’s involvement with a hospital or research
institute. The perceptions of the local population will also indicate if the entity
is a government instrumentality.196 This factor will serve as a beneficial asset
to future counsel tasked with determining their client’s corporations’ FCPA
liability.
C. The DOJ and the SEC Have Broadened the Meaning of Foreign Official
and Instrumentality
In stark contrast to the FCPA’s legislative history and the Lindsey and
Carson decisions, the DOJ and the SEC have adopted expansive views of the
terms foreign official and instrumentality in their non-binding administrative
pronouncements.197 The DOJ Opinion Procedure Releases are unclear about
the type of entity that will qualify as an instrumentality. 198 Although the
releases do indicate that the DOJ will look for state ownership when it
examines if an entity—either explicitly or implicitly—is an instrumentality,199
the agency is silent about the degree of government ownership necessary for

192. Compare supra Part I.C (discussing the DOJ and SEC releases that declared certain
entities to be instrumentalities without providing guidance regarding level of state ownership
necessary for that determination), with supra Part I.D (discussing the factors applied by courts to
examine the level of control and financing needed by the subject for it to be considered an
instrumentality).
193. See supra Part I.D (describing the detailed list of factors promulgated by the Aguilar and
Carson courts).
194. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
195. See id. (listing whether the entity performs an official government function as one of the
five non-exhaustive characteristics that are often common with an instrumentality).
196. See id. (noting that community perception and level of government involvement are
among the important factors for determining whether an entity is an instrumentality under the
FCPA).
197. See supra Part I.C.
198. See supra Part I.C.1.
199. See FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 (determining that the wholly state-owned
entity was an instrumentality); FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note 92, at 1 (determining that the
general director of the state-owned enterprise was a foreign official); FCPA OPR 08-01, supra
note 109, at 12 (determining that the DOJ would not take action against the American company
for engaging the chairman of a part-owned government entity).
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the instrumentality designation. 200 Additionally, the DOJ will not take into
account a foreign jurisdiction’s opinion as to who qualifies as a foreign
official.201 Ultimately, these releases indicate that even if the DOJ determined
that an entity is an instrumentality, it may not commence enforcement
proceedings if the entity’s status as a foreign official was ending,202 payments
or fees to the official would be reimbursed by the foreign government,203 or if
the American company made promises to educate its foreign partner about
FCPA compliance.204
The SEC’s non-binding litigation releases and administrative orders,
although more factually specific than the DOJ’s pronouncements, define
foreign official and instrumentality in equally broad terms.205 For example, the
Syncor and DePu releases demonstrate two important considerations for
businesses working with foreign health systems: (1) state-operated hospitals
are considered instrumentalities by the SEC;206 and (2) physicians employed
by those hospitals—especially those who control purchasing decisions—are
treated as foreign officials.207 These considerations, when viewed in light of
the DOJ’s Opinion Procedure Releases, indicate that some level of state
ownership places an entity within the instrumentality category.208 Further, the
DOJ and SEC releases show that entities either wholly owned 209 or

200. Compare FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 and ); FCPA OPR 94-01, supra note
92, at 1 (discussing foreign instrumentalities that were apparently wholly state-owned), with
FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 2 (noting that the purported instrumentality in question was
partly state-owned).
201. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
202. FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 10, 12.
203. FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1.
204. Id.
205. See generally Diagnostic Prods. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 51724, 2005 SEC
LEXIS 1185, at *1 (May 20, 2005) (arguing that defendant DPC violated the FCPA by making
commission payments to doctors and employees of state-owned hospital laboratories); SEC v.
Syncor Int’l Corp., Litigation Release No. 17887, 2002 WL 31761454 (Dec. 10, 2002) (arguing
that Syncor violated the FCPA by making payments to doctors in hospitals that were controlled
by foreign authorities).
206. See Diagnostic Prods. Corp., 2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at *3–5 (stating that the Chinese
state-owned hospitals that comprised DePu’s customer base were instrumentalities); see also
Syncor Int’l Corp., 2002 WL 31761454, at *1258 (explaining that Syncor’s foreign subsidiaries
made payments to physicians employed by state-run hospitals).
207. Syncor Int’l Corp., 2002 WL 31761454, at *1262; see also Diagnostic Prods. Corp.,
2005 SEC LEXIS 1185, at *3 (finding that the defendant violated the FCPA by making payments
to doctors at government-owned hospitals in China).
208. Compare supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining that the SEC views stateowned hospitals as instrumentalities), with supra notes 138 and 151 and accompanying text
(explaining that state-ownership, whether in whole or in part, is seemingly a factor in the
instrumentality determination).
209. See, e.g., FCPA OPR 93-01, supra note 94, at 1 (providing an example of a wholly
owned government entity as an instrumentality).

2013]

Foreign Officials and Instrumentalities and the FCPA

535

majority-owned210 by a government are instrumentalities, which could lead to
the argument that entities minority-owned by a government are not
instrumentalities.
D. The Lack of Clarity in the Statute and the Current Enforcement Trend Has
an Adverse Effect on Business
The lack of clarity in the FCPA and the current trend of increased
enforcement has resulted in high costs for American businesses and foreign
businesses with American branches that may conduct business abroad. In
order to comply with the FCPA, many companies must undertake onerous due
diligence and implement large-scale compliance programs. 211 Furthermore,
the cost of due diligence and compliance does not include the potentially
enormous fines that a company may have to pay under a settlement
agreement,212 with Siemens’s $800 million settlement as a prime example.213
Although large multinational corporations can afford the costs of doing
business related to the FCPA,214 smaller companies may not have such fiscal
flexibility.215 Therefore, smaller companies may face greater barriers to entry
into foreign markets due to the large costs related to FCPA compliance.216
210. See, e.g., FCPA OPR 08-01, supra note 109, at 2 (discussing the majority
government-owned entity in a release in which the DOJ refrained from acting yet declined to state
that the entity was not an instrumentality).
211. See House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at 3–4 (stating that many businesses
spend millions of dollars to develop and implement sophisticated compliance systems); see also
Koehler, supra note 18, at 1001 (explaining that compliance based on information gleaned from
non-binding plea agreements is wasteful and expensive); Westbrook, supra note 80, at 561
(explaining that the FCPA’s uncertainty results in significant costs for companies, especially in
compliance measures).
212. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 555–56 (detailing the multi-million dollar FCPA
settlements that companies such as Siemens, Halliburton/KBR, and BAE Systems have paid).
213. See Dan Slater, Siemens Settles in U.S. for $800 Mil, Leaving $$ for German
Authorities, WSJ LAW BLOG (Dec. 15, 2008, 8:57 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008
/12/15/siemens-settles-in-us-for-800-mil-leaving-for-german-authorities (noting an $800 million
settlement entered into by a European company to dismiss an action arising under the FCPA).
214. See Mike Koehler, Two-Tiered Justice?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 20, 2010),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/two-tiered-justice (postulating that the current FCPA enforcement
trend has created a “two-tiered justice system” in which large corporate actors are able to pay the
settlement’s full cost and even retain business with the U.S. government, whereas smaller actors
cannot so easily avoid FCPA liability).
215. See Rashna Bhojwani, Note, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private
Enforcement Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 95–96 (2012) (explaining that the private
consequences of an FCPA violation are potentially catastrophic for small-to-medium-sized
businesses).
216. Cf. DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSEN, BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE
GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 13 (2011), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/busting-bribery-sustaining-global-momentum-for
eign-corrupt-practices-act (explaining that current FCPA enforcement trends not tempered by
judicial review will create high barriers to entry in foreign markets for small businesses).
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If the FCPA terms were narrowed and clarified, the playing field would be
leveled.217 Introducing transparency in the foreign official and instrumentality
terms—whether through amendment, case law, or agency guidance—will
reduce the costs required for compliance efforts.218 Further, lowering costs for
due diligence and compliance will allow smaller and larger companies to fairly
compete, resulting in greater consumer choice and pricing.219
III. A TWO-PART ANALYSIS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
INSTRUMENTALITIES AND FOREIGN OFFICIALS WILL PROMOTE GREATER
OVERSEAS INVESTMENT AND ACCURATELY TARGET TRUE VIOLATORS OF THE
FCPA
As discussed previously, the DOJ and the SEC vowed to continue rigorous
FCPA enforcement.220 However, the FCPA could potentially chill overseas
investment as businesses have little binding authority or guidance to precisely
analyze whether an individual or entity is a foreign official or
instrumentality.221 The majority of the “law” that corporate counsel have to
work with is the DOJ’s and the SEC’s broad positions in their administrative
rulings and settlements.222 To remedy this demand for authoritative guidance,
courts should adopt a two-step analysis based on the Lindsey and Carson
opinions and the FCPA’s legislative history.
This analysis would first examine whether an alleged government entity is
an instrumentality, and second whether an employee of said instrumentality
possesses any discretionary authority. Application of this framework will
assist authorities in targeting only those companies that affirmatively attempt
to corrupt government employees that have actual discretion over government
action. A refined analysis that clarifies the foreign official and instrumentality
terms would prevent corrupt actors from relying on a defense based on the
vague and undefined nature of the statute’s terms. This will allow for more
accurate prosecution of foreign corruption and eliminate any potential chilling
effect on foreign investment.

217. See Koehler, supra note 4, at 131–32 (arguing for a narrow definition, which would lead
to more consistent rulings).
218. Cf. Westbrook, supra note 80, at 575 (explaining that clarified terms in the FCPA will
make it easier for companies to effectuate compliance programs).
219. See Kovacich, supra note 164, at 559 (finding that compliance will be easier if the
regulations are interpreted more narrowly and consistently).
220. See Greene, supra note 163.
221. See Kovacich, supra note 164; see also Roger M. Witten et al, Prescriptions for
Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing
Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 723
(2009) (noting the non-binding nature of SEC and DOJ releases).
222. See Westbrook, supra note 80, at 560; see also supra Part II.C.
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A. An Instrumentality Should Be Either Wholly or Majority-Owned by a
Foreign Government and Operate as a Dependent Arm of the State
The Lindsey and Carson cases represent positive steps in clarifying what
entities qualify as an instrumentality.223 To determine whether a foreign entity
may qualify as an instrumentality, courts should first examine the extent of the
entity’s government ownership and operation. 224 Majority ownership is the
most rational level of ownership and is most closely aligned with the Lindsey
and Carson opinions225 as well as the DOJ and SEC releases.226 As part of this
analysis, some practitioners have suggested looking at the degree of
nationalization or privatization in a country.227
In addition to the foregoing factors, courts should analyze the entity’s
function or purpose because this may be relevant to whether the entity is an
instrumentality.228 This part of the analysis would examine whether the entity
is commercial in nature, like a state-owned pharmaceutical company, 229 or
governmental in nature, like a public health agency.230 If the entity is primarily
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09–00077–JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2011) (explaining that the extent of government ownership is a relevant factor for
determining if an entity is an instrumentality); United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108,
1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that an instrumentality is financed in large part by the public).
225. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (explaining that a government should finance an
instrumentality and that CFE possessed that characteristic); cf. Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *4
(explaining that a “mere” financial stake by a government in an entity is not sufficient to
determine its instrumentality status); see also House Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3, at
20 (statement of the Hon. Michael Mukasey, Former Att’y Gen, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP) (recommending that the statute be amended to indicate the level of government ownership
required for the entity to qualify as an instrumentality, and specifying that a majority share is “the
most plausible threshold”).
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 19–20 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing national socialization when defining
instrumentalities and explaining that the more privatized a nation is, the less likely a given entity
is an instrumentality).
228. See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (stating CFE was responsible for the supply of
electricity, a function described by the Mexican government as a “quintessential government
function.”). In Carson, the defendants were charged with bribing power companies. Carson,
2011 WL 5101701, at *1–2. As in Aguilar, where the entity in question was an instrumentality
that had a “quintessential” government function, the court denied the motion to dismiss the
indictment. Id. at *8.
229. See, e.g., Central Public Sector Undertakings, GOV’T OF INDIA, DEP’T OF PHARM.,
MINISTRY OF CHEMS. AND FERTILIZERS, at 2, http://pharmaceuticals.gov.in/cpsu.pdf (describing
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Limited, one of India’s five publicly-owned pharmaceutical
companies).
230. See Meier & Mori, supra note 184, at 133 (noting that the WHO Constitution states that
governments are responsible for protecting the public health and well-being). But see James B.
Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health Care and Why We Need it Now,
13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1028–29 (2001) (noting that in Germany, the private sector, and
not the government, is responsible for healthcare).
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commercial in nature, a court should examine the level of ownership231 before
examining whether or not the entity is “widely understood to be performing
official government functions.” 232 However, where the entity is primarily
governmental, a court may conclude that the entity is an instrumentality.233
This part of the inquiry would allow a court to discern those commercial
ventures in which a government may have a stake from those instrumentalities
that provide services to a population.234 This additional analysis allows a court
to examine with precision whether a company was truly targeting an official of
a government entity to secure an improper business advantage.
B. A Foreign Government Employee Should Possess Discretionary Authority
to Secure a Business Advantage in Order to Qualify as a Foreign Official
After the instrumentality assessment, an additional step is necessary to
determine if that employee has any corruptible discretion. The legislative
history demonstrates a struggle between including a broad definition of official
versus including a restrictive definition that encompasses only those with
discretionary authority. 235 Because the statute requires corrupt intent, 236
however, an official must have some duty involving free will so that a payment
could persuade him or her against acting properly.237 The statutory language
does not support the assertion that every employee is corruptible and,
therefore, should qualify as a foreign official.238
Requiring courts to examine whether the employee in question possesses
corruptible discretionary authority would separate actual officials from mere
government employees. Individuals with a position of power or influence who
could secure opportunities for foreign businesses would qualify as foreign
officials within the original meaning of the statutory term. 239 Further,
employees, such as mid-level staff members, who do not have the discretionary
authority of management-level employees would not qualify as foreign

231. See text accompanying notes 224–26.
232. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
233. See id. (concluding that the CFE was an instrumentality carrying out a government
function of providing electricity).
234. See notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006) (prohibiting a corrupt payment to a foreign
official). Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb “corrupt” as “to change (a person’s morals or
principles) from good to bad.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 397 (9th ed. 2009).
237. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (“In using the word ‘corruptly’, the committee
intends to distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise other than his free
will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those payments . . . which do not
involve any discretionary action.”).
238. See supra Part II.B.
239. See supra Part II.B.
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officials.240 Focusing on discretionary authority aligns the “foreign official”
term with the legislative history.241 Further, such analysis would ensure that
the law targets only those companies that, in fact, targeted a foreign
instrumentality’s employee with bribes because of his or her influence within
the government.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the DOJ and the SEC’s current enforcement push, the
business community is grappling with the FCPA’s terms. Companies seeking
to conduct business abroad are confronted with a difficult choice—engage in
expensive due diligence and implement a costly compliance program to cover
all potential scenarios, or risk massive fines or settlements from concurrent
DOJ and SEC enforcement proceedings. Companies subject to the FCPA’s
jurisdiction need an appropriate tool to navigate the FCPA in this heightened
enforcement environment. The proposed two-part analysis based on the
FCPA’s legislative history and recent court opinions will introduce
transparency into the FCPA and allow the business community to ensure that
they are engaged in fair and honest business dealings. A clarified FCPA will
adequately equip those who are subject to the Act’s jurisdiction with the tools
to respond to the government’s current enforcement push, while ensuring that
those who are truly engaged in foreign bribery will be cast into the sunlight.

240. See, e.g., Staff Scientist, Intramural Prof’l Designations & Procedures, Intramural
Research Sourcebook, Nat’l Insts. of Health, http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/prof-desig/staff
-sci.htm (explaining that the staff scientist position at NIH is a time-limited support position that
does not have the authority to initiate new research programs). The sourcebook also notes that
staff scientists are not paid via the traditional General Schedule Civil Service (GS) salary
mechanism for federal employees. Id. A comparable employee in a foreign research institute
potentially may not receive a salary directly from the government and similarly lack authority
within the institute for new research. It seems unlikely that such an individual with circumscribed
authority could be considered a foreign official under the FCPA.
241. See supra part II.B (discussing the legislative history of the FCPA).
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